Date: 24 Jan 2012


India's "defence" is a cheap and vulgar JOKE. The Air Marshal has written well on India's military and defence since 1947. (Below). We can add a couple of comments:\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 1. Leaders of India had ZERO concept of defence on the very day the learned author calls "Independence", covering up the IMPLICATIONS for defence at that very time and in the times ahead. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 2. If NEHRU was representing India, and the "totally vulnerable & badly exposed" Hindus, then it is safe to believe that he was the real ENEMY and the Hindu brains, spirit and guts had been crushed into pulp during the preceding thousand years of degrading slavery under the world's most savage and brutal invaders and occupiers.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 3. Blind adoration of MK ("Bapu") Gandhi beyond all reason and commonsense means that the Hindus would still rather be shot, hanged, bullied, beaten and enlsaved than "dump" the LIABILITY called "Gandhi" in order to take up the SAVIOURS like Shivaji, Netaji and Guru Gobind Singhji in right earnest. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 4. Our HINDU nation is totally wedded to Ahimsa, calling it "PARMO DHARMA". We are all voluntarily drinking the poison to die. We are such a SHAMELESS nation that we have never officially recalled that once Multan, Karachi, East Bengal and EVEN KHYBER PASS were in Bharat. Nor are we bothered to pursue the criminals who just delivered everything (homes, shops, fields, lands, towns, cities and mandirs) to the ENEMY like those unfortunate Rajput princesses in Akbar's harem. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 5. A millennium of slavery and degradation under the brutal rulers' foot has made us LOSE the concept of FRIEND & FOE. Even our sword bearing martial SIKHS go on cahnting, "NA KO BARRY, SAGAL SANG HAMREE BANN AYEE." In the whole world NO OTHER individual, community, nation or religioins thinks on these lines of "having NO enemy."\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 6. To call it "Independence" but not DEFEAT or SURRENDER itself shows that we are such cuckoos that vicory and defeat, Independence of India and Mutlation of India, are ONE AND THE SAME THING. If we do not acknowledge it as defeat then how can we prepare for victory? \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 7. A sleepy, semi conscious nation that can walk forward and backward with the head cut off is simply existing at the mercy of the others. Right now the "others" are ITALY & ISLAM that have turned the Hindu nation into a "donkey" to ride on. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ By Reality Check neither the Muslims have an excuse to be in Broken Bharat after taking out FIVE provicnes to establish their PAKISTAN, nor the ITALIANS who are just plundering the poor all the time. The enemy is lucky to have both hands in the national till while at the same time CONVERTING the sheepish unattached, de-linked, "gauravless" and betrayed Hindus.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 8. India's defence became untenable, if not a joke, on the day of her PARTITION with the ENEMY inside and on EITHER SIDE, too.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\24 Jan 12. =========== Bureaucratic Mischief with the Military!\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Air Marshal RK Nehra\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Book Excerpt: “Hinduism & its Military Ethos”.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ 26 December, 2011 \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ When India became free, one of the first tasks was to evolve a new structure for management of the Defense set-up. Therefore, it would be relevant to enumerate the broad principles on which the defense structure of a democratic country needs to be built:\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ • In a democracy, there has to be ‘civil’ control over military; But the word ‘civil’ means political (and only political) and not bureaucratic.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ War is the most complex and specialized activity that a man engages in. What makes a soldier give his life (for the country) is an issue far more complex than even understanding the nature of God. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Over the ages, millions have claimed to understand the concept of God. But those who understood the motivation behind the soldier’s willingness to die would be in thousands, may be only hundreds. It is not claimed that all generals understand these issues, but some of them do. We have to identify them and bring them up. In short, issues of war have to be left to the generals. They must be listened to with respect directly by the politicians, not through, or via the media of bureaucrats. In any set up, a lot of space must to left to the generals to plan and manoeuver. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• Each cog in the defense structure which has some degree of power must have an equivalent amount of responsibility and accountability; and that must be defined in very precise terms leaving no room for ambiguity, and manipulability to escape responsibility. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ All the above principles were violated with impunity in evolving the defense structure of independent India. In view of the lukewarm interest (and lack of capability) of the politicians, bureaucrats took on the job. Of course, the politician reminded the bureaucrat of the principle of a ‘tight leash’. The Indian bureaucracy (the ICS and IAS) has some of the finest brains of the country. They set about designing a structure in which generals were pushed on to the periphery, from which they could: \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• Neither participate in any meaningful way in the decision making process. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• Nor protest over being excluded.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ In other words, the generals could be seen (occasionally), but were not to be heard.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Service Headquarters were given the status of attached subordinate offices. An umbrella-type all encompassing Ministry of Defense (MoD) was created and put above these subordinate offices. All powers — organizational, financial and promotional — were concentrated in the hands of the bureaucrats at the MoD. The post of Defense Secretary was created, who soon enough assumed powers of an “ersatz” Chief of Defense Staff. The Defense Secretary and as, indeed, the Joint Secretaries, can walk in and out of the office of the Defense Minister several times a day. The Service Chiefs generally get to meet the Defense Minister only at weekly meetings.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ With their close proximity to the politicians, bureaucrats in the MoD have the ear of the Defense Minister. Whenever they find him in a relaxed mood, they can always whisper a thing or two into his ear. The note for the selection of a new Service Chief is initiated by a Joint Secretary, in which he could cleverly build in the necessary biases. Defense Secretary would pen the final note in which he would, of course, keep the ‘pliability’ factor in view. The deputies to the Service Chiefs, called the Principal Staff Officers at Service Headquarters, have no chance of interacting with the Defense Minister. Views of the generals cannot be conveyed to the Defense Minister, unless and until these have been edited, chipped and chopped by the Deputy and Joint Secretaries. An iron wall in the form of bureaucracy came to be built between the military and the politicians, between the Defense Minister and the generals. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ In the foregoing, we have laid major part of the blame for the present state of affairs in the Indian defense set up on the shoulders of politicians and bureaucrats. We have, largely, spared the generals. That is not fair. Generals must also carry a good share of blame for their many acts of commission and omission. On the advent of independence, as stated earlier by us, the politicians gave somewhat of a cold shoulder to the generals. Far from being alarmed from that, the generals might have felt even a bit relieved. They might have argued, ‘Let us talk to the politician through the bureaucrat; he speaks our type of English’. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The generals showed a singular lack of vision in not appreciating that the politician controls every lever of power. The overall blame could possibly be distributed as follows: — One third each to politician, bureaucrats and generals — In India, politician is the ‘mai-baap’ (all-in-all); he should be given 50% of the blame; the remainder 50% being shared equally between the bureaucrats and the generals. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ At this stage, it must be stated to the credit of the bureaucrat that he only moved in the space which the generals were reluctant to occupy. By the time the generals woke up, it was too late; the bureaucrat was well entrenched and had the ear of the politician. If a general was to express even a mild dissent with the state of affairs, he could be branded anti-national. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Something on these lines appears to have happened to a Naval Chief, who was sacked most unceremoniously. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Throughout the history of independent India, generals have generally failed to put up their point of view with the required degree of clarity and emphasis. Is it possible that we have failed to produce generals of the right calibre? Irrespective of the actual position, the prevalent belief is that we did produce ‘good’ generals. Whatever, the generals did not assert when it was imperative to do so, sometimes even in national interest. There could be many reasons for that — the rat race for promotions being one of the important one. It is not easy to disregard the ‘goodies’ that come with the post. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Another reason could be the intense Inter-Service rivalry. That exists in all countries, including the USA which even has a ‘Joint Chief of Staff’. However in India, the rivalry exceeds all limits, and is the most distinguishing feature of all Inter-Service interactions. That rivalry is not going to go away even if we appoint a ‘Chief of Defense Staff’, which in any case, would not solve any of the problems presently staring ‘India’s Defense’ in its face. It would just add another cog to the wheel, and make the issues even more complex (However, it is a bigger question, and needs a separate discussion.)\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ One way to put the Armed forces ‘in their place’, is through means of Pay Commissions. As such, a decision was taken at a very early stage not to allow a General anywhere near the outskirts of the Pay Commissions. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The sixth Pay Commission submitted its report in early 2008. By an ingenious thought process, it upset the long established equivalence between the various ranks of the armed forces, vis-a-vis the para-military. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Among other things, it pushed the police DGP of a state to a higher level than a Lieutenant General (non GOC-in-C). That meant that the DGP of even the smallest state (with a police force of say 7,000), and DGP (Housing) of UP, rank higher than a Corps Commander, with 60,000 troops, guarding the most sensitive part of the Western border.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ When a hue and cry was raised, the government kept on deliberating over it for more than a year at various levels, i.e. Committee of IAS Secretaries (no generals permitted), Group of Ministers. Whilst some Relief Packages were announced, the question of status of the Lt Gen was further complicated. Displaying exceptional ingenuity, combined with rare depravity, the Lt Gens were further split vertically. It was decreed that only ?rd of the Lt Gens will be given a higher grade; the rest ? must rot at the ‘Low’ grade. That decree has created three tiers of Lt Gens (perhaps unprecedented in the world):\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Lt Gen — GOC-in-C\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Lt Gen — High grade (1/3rd) \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Lt Gen — Low grade (2/3rd)\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ In the IAS, some 80–90% become Additional Secretaries, and about 60–70% full Secretaries. In the Armed Forces, only about 10% reach the level of Lt Gen. After that agonizing and hazardous journey, the Lt Gen is informed, “Please cool your heels in the low grade, till we get time to look at you.” That can shatter the most committed and the most loyal. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ There is only one level each of (full) Secretary, and Additional Secretary. Why shred the rank of Lt Gen, all for a paltry few lakhs (hundred thousands) rupees a year; or is there a deeper scheme? \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ It is these ‘low grade’ Lt Gens, who as Corps Commanders are at the cutting edge of the battle. In the final analysis, it is their plans and push and daring that determines the difference between ‘Victory’ and ‘Defeat’. No sane nation will put its generals with ‘a grievance on their mind’, to face the enemy in the actual battlefield. That is how the psychology and nature of war works, which as a nation we do not understand. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ A mindset which can think of this type of mischievous scheme (split Lt Gens into 3 grades) can do anything to destroy the cohesiveness of the Armed Forces. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ However, under a lot of pressure, the issue was partially resolved in January 2010 i.e. after about 2 years; the generals gained as Additional Secretaries had to be accommodated.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ In the present defense structure, whilst all power rests with the Ministry of Defense, they have no accountability worth the name. The present defense structure has evolved not on the sacred principle of ‘national interest’, but on the demeaning principle of ‘power grab’ and keeping the Armed Forces ‘on the leash’. The disastrous results are there to see as we shall enumerate in the following chapter. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ We may spend a few minutes to understand China’s view of its military. Chinese communists established their rule in China at about the same time as India got its freedom. Contrary to the Indian scene, leaders of the new China were product of the ‘Long March’; all of them had seen actual field action, and watched their comrades fall on the battlefront. We may recall that the British politicians have had similar experience. Once you have seen death at close quarters, your view of military, if not of life itself, changes. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Mao Tse Dung was a military genius, who actually enunciated new doctrines of war; he took control of the Chinese State. Mao did not need any briefings from generals; rather he briefed them on the conduct of war. For the first 30 years or so, the effective power in China rested with the military. That period was enough to weave and integrate military thinking in the national psyche. Later, when civilian elements were brought in, the armed forces continued to be a player in the decision making process, if not up-front, at least in the background. That is the difference between China and India. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ For the Chinese, militarism is a sort of religion; for India, it is just one of the routine issues (like say minority affairs), which the IAS must deal with in their day to day routine manner. That is why the Chinese could wrap ropes around us in 1962. But Indians would not like to recognize that fundamental truth. They would like to continue to believe that we lost in 1962 because we did not have proper boots, or some such other similar silly excuse. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The Chinese PLA had fought battles of the Long March either in bathroom slippers or bare-footed, in the biting and intolerable cold of China — some 50% having perished during the march itself. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The moral of the story is: \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• Forces must aim, plan and endeavour to fight with adequate numbers and adequate equipment. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• However, if necessary under any circumstance, forces must be (mentally) prepared to fight (successfully), with inadequate numbers and inadequate equipment. That is what nationhood and (good) generalship is all about. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Whatever we have stated in the preceding two paragraphs does not mean that the Chinese have any great military advantage over India; they don’t. In the level of performance, no soldier in the world can measure up to the Indian soldier. All that India has to do is to incorporate changes in its mindset, and get its act together at the higher levels of military and civil leadership. If that can be done, the Indian Armed Forces can take on the ‘best’ in the world; let there be no doubt on that account. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ In 2009, Admiral Sureesh Mehta was the Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman of the ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee’. On 10 August 2009, he dropped a bombshell on the unsuspecting Indian public. In a televised address, the Admiral emphatically declared that India was no match for China, and that there was no way the yawning gap between the two could be bridged. What a public statement to come from the Chairman of the ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee’. Even if there was an element of truth in this, the top Defense functionary of the land should be the last person to say that in public. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\ If such a situation actually exists, it has to be the result of gross all-round neglect (political, bureaucratic and military) over a 20–30 year period; it could not have emerged in a year or two. The Admiral (actually the General) should have briefed the Cabinet Committee on Security in the close confines of the War Room; not a word to come out. And that should have been done within a few months of the Admiral taking-over, and not a few days (yes days) before his retirement. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The public statement has achieved merely the following:\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ • It tries to project China as a huge bug-bear, whom we must fear; this is an admirable self-goal. China’s projected military advantage is largely a product of our ‘Defeatist’ mindset. Even the tiny Vietnam is not as afraid of China, as our public postures (including TV debates) make India to be. India is a huge country with great resources; it is no push-over. We do not have to keep harping on China; let us set our sights at a different level. What is needed is a change in mindset in the higher echelons of governance, as well as in society. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• It has dealt a mortal blow to the morale of the Indian soldier. Earlier, we had blamed the politicians and bureaucrats for not understanding the concept of ‘military morale’. We have to now admit with great regret (and some shame) that admirals (generals) may be doing no better. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The ‘earth-shaking’ (only our perception) statement of the Admiral evoked no response from the government, or the ever watchful, ever alert media. Even the main opposition party, the BJP, who claims a monopoly on nationalism, just looked on half in agreement, half in bewilderment; there was not even a whimper of reaction from them. Perhaps, they, like the government, did not understand what the Admiral was trying to say. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ If the Admiral was even partially correct, the government should have been in a ‘tizzy’, and latched on to this one single issue. If the Admiral was wrong, the government should have clarified the situation at the level of the Prime Minister. The PM spoke twice in Parliament on a non-issue like Balochistan (just mention of this name in an irrelevant piece of paper, called joint statement). Why the deathly silence on this ‘life and death’ issue for the nation? \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ This is indicative of the ‘sickening’ low level that the defense issues occupy in this woeful land. But, who are we to complain? There are very wise and prescient men in charge of the nation’s destiny. We should mind our own business, and just shut-up (which we dutifully do, except for making one last comment below). \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Perhaps for the first time in the history of modern democratic nations, the top Defense functionary has informed the nation in advance of (almost) certain defeat (to us, the word ‘no match’ does not permit of any other interpretation; we use the word ‘defeat’ with utmost reluctance, and with a sense of horror). Lack of any political response, not even a ‘twitter’ or ‘tweet’, would appear to suggest the following: \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\• There is nothing new about it; the political class always knew about it. • If 37 years after learning our lesson in 1962, we are still ‘no match’, why keep on pumping more and more money in Defense? \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The political class appears to be of the view that we may not unnecessarily worry our head about this ‘no match’ issue. If things go wrong in any conflict, they can always explain things away. India has a ready-made set of excuses for defeat; those can be presented to the nation. Indian people are simple and trusting. They are neither prone to, nor known to, object to what the government tells them. Remember, they lapped up every word that the government told them about the 1962 debacle, i.e. that the (shameful) defeat was really not our fault; someone else must have been responsible. \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Most Indians are still heard muttering in their sleep, ‘Oh! We were defeated in 1962 due to lack of boots/socks, deficiency in equipment, may be also some shortage of food.’ Others are convinced that we were defeated because the Chinese were just too strong. That has been our hallowed tradition from the days of Ghazni and Ghauri. The people never held the rulers accountable in the past; why would they do it now? Indians are a decent set of people; they do not believe in making unnecessary trouble; they are the accommodating type.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ The politicians would add that the Indian public knows and appreciates that they (the politicians) are fully busy (both waking and sleeping hours) in attending to the issues of terrorism. Where is the time for them to attend to the Defense issues? As soon as they find some leisure, they would devote time to Defense; Insha-Allah (God willing) that should happen soon. Why make all this fuss and noise? We must have patience — another great Hindu virtue 000000000